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1 In  Democracy  and  Education Dewey presents  a  vision of  a  richly  liberal  conception of
education, one that sees education as fundamentally transformative, from the opening
naturalistic  conception  of  living  things  maintaining  ‘themselves  by  renewal’  to  the
conception of education as “a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience”
(MW 9: 82).1 This is transformative on a number of different levels. It transforms the
individual: in ancient Athens “custom and traditional beliefs held men in bondage” (MW
9:  272)  and  education  needs  to  provide  the  “reconstruction  or  reorganization  of
experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct
the  course  of  consequent  experience”  (MW  9:  82).  However  much  this  requires
transformation of the individual, Dewey is clear that there is a social dimension to the
transformative role and purpose of education. The ancient Greeks, for example, did not
liberate all from the bondage of custom. Our critique of the class divisions in ancient
Athens is only honest if “we are free from responsibility for perpetuating the educational
practices which train the many for pursuits involving mere skill in production, and the
few for a knowledge that is an ornament and a cultural embellishment” (MW 9: 265). A
truly democratic society is one “in which all share in useful service and all enjoy a worthy
leisure” (MW 9: 265). Education for democracy requires deep immersion in culture for all,
for a “democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated
living, of conjoint communicated experience” (MW 9: 93). And, for all this to be possible,
pivotally education requires the acquisition of the higher order abilities for learning how
to learn, learning how to be an inquirer, for “a society which is mobile, which is full of
channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it  that its
members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability” (MW 9: 93-4).
2 Dewey’s vision is extensive and, arguably, prohibitively expensive. It is extensive for its
opposition to the sort of instrumentalism about education with which we have become
increasingly  familiar.2 For  Dewey,  education  is  about  equipping  people  with  the
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experiences and abilities to take part across the board in the shared enterprise of human
culture, in exercises of ‘conjoint communicated experience.’ In addition, it is a conception
of  education  that  posits  deep  dependencies  between  the  provision  of  individual
transformation (personal initiative and adaptability) and social transformations (conjoint
communicated experience). It is this latter point that threatens the economic viability of
Dewey’s  vision.  In  a  policy  climate  in  which  service  provision  is  measured  for  its
contribution to the economic well-being of society, a Deweyan liberalism about education
will  always  lose  out  to  an  economic  instrumentalism that  accepts  a  stratification of
opportunities in education. Dewey’s requirement that all experience the immersion in
culture on which individual adaptability depends will  lose out in the competition for
economic resources unless it can provide the basis for a fundamental re-thinking of the
intrinsic purposes of education. That is the point of Kitcher’s (2009) well-known defense
of Dewey. In this essay, I want to develop some of the tools needed for undertaking this
re-thinking.
3 A central question must concern the nature and direction of the dependency between
individual transformation and social transformation. I do not propose to decide on the
issue of which, if either, is basic? There is, however, room for understanding, in a good
deal more detail, the key ideas that drive Dewey’s thinking and which might help hold his
vision together. A key idea in Democracy and Education is the concept of adaptability. It
operates  at  both  the  individual  and  social  level.  It  requires  an  ability  to  respond
intelligently to novelty, howsoever that may arise. And although Dewey opens the book
with a naturalistic sentiment of life as “a self-renewing process through action upon the
environment” (MW 9: 4), that process is already conceived as an open-ended enterprise,
for he says, “the living thing […] tries to turn the energies which act upon it into means of
its own further existence” (MW 9: 4).
4 This  suggests  the  project  of  timely  adaptation to  the  contingencies  met  with in  the
environment is the individual’s project and demands of the individual the wherewithal to
respond to happenings with imagination. And that thought is key to the statement of
educational values much later in Chapter 18. Dewey there remarks,
play-activity is an imaginative enterprise. But it is still usual to regard this activity
as a specially marked-off stage of childish growth, and to overlook the fact that the
difference between play and what is regarded as serious employment should be not
a difference between the presence and absence of imagination, but a difference in
the materials with which imagination is occupied. (MW 9: 245)
5 He goes on:
The emphasis  put  in  this  book […] upon activity,  will  be  misleading if  it  is  not
recognized that the imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human
activity as is muscular movement. (Ibid.)
6 I  want  to  suggest  that  at  the  heart  of  Dewey’s  key  concept  of  adaptability  is  the
imagination; that the heart of what it is to be an inquirer responding to problems is to be
a  subject  with  imagination.  It  is  the  imagination  that  is  the  key  driver  to  the
transformations  at  stake  in  education.  It  is  the  imagination  that  holds  together  the
different strands of Dewey’s liberalism.
7 If we endorse Dewey’s rich liberalism, we have a tool for a critique of the managerialism
about educational policy found throughout Europe. But with what right can we endorse
Dewey’s liberalism? I shall trace the case for Dewey’s liberalism back to his conception of
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inquiry. I want to argue that a proper appreciation of Dewey’s model of inquiry lays the
foundation for a radical underpinning of his richly liberal conception of education.
8 Here is a simple way of setting out the trajectory I want to explore:
• For Dewey, learning is the activity of inquiry.
• Inquiry starts with a problem (it is historically rooted).
• Inquiry ends when the problem is solved.
9 Adaptation is done in response to problems, and comes to rest (for the time being) when
the problem is solved. So education should be geared to solve problems, not serve the
economy,  nor  the  instrumental  targets  set  by  modern  managerialism.  But  what  are
problems and what are Europe’s problems re education? There are multiple potential
answers to the latter question, many of which are important, but I want to concentrate on
the former question, for I  think that our key theoretical problem is that we have no
detailed and cogent account of how to answer that first question:
• What is a problem?
10 Furthermore, I want to suggest a reading of Dewey on problems that provides a radical
critique of much extant thought on education and the conditions for learning: problems
start at a level of experience properly called the aesthetic.
11 Others have marked out  some of  this  path,  but  thus far  the role of  the aesthetic  of
experience has not been accorded the full seriousness and importance it warrants.3 On
the approach I pursue, the aesthetic is not merely an important element of experience
that figures in both the drive and consummation of inquiry, it is the condition for the
very possibility of inquiry. The idea of inquiry does not make sense without an account of
its origins, its practice and its resolution in the aesthetic. If this is right, at the heart of
any credible pedagogy there must be an account of the role of the aesthetic as the driver,
vehicle and consummation of inquiry. 
12 Dewey sees inquiry starting with what, for want of a better label, we might call an ‘itch’;
it’s the sense of irritation, of things being not quite so. It’s the sense of unease that all is
not right, our place in the environment is out of kilter. Inquiry concerns the dynamic that
takes  us  along  a  trajectory  defined  by  “the  rhythm  of  loss  of  integration  with  the
environment and recovery of union” (LW 10: 20-1).4 As Fesmire (2015: 87) explains the
dynamic: “Reflective thought is provoked by a hitch in the works, when an unsettled
world stops being congenial to our expectations.”
13 The ‘itch’ is the irritation, the sense that things do not fit. It prompts inquiry, which is
resolved when a sense of fit is recovered. But the recovery of a sense of fit is also a
recovery that equips us with meaning and understanding, a conceptual grasp of how our
problems got resolved. The sense of fit cannot, therefore, be wholly isolated from those
cognitive  processes  that  provide  understanding.  We  need  an  account  of  how  the
aesthetics  of  experience,  although  outwith  the  range  of  a  conceptual  and  knowing
experience of things, nevertheless provides the condition for the possibility of an inquiry
that issues in conceptual knowing, no matter how much we might also want to insist that
inquiry’s closure is only properly delivered by a renewed sense of fit that settles the
initial  itch.  On the reading of  Dewey I  offer,  the aesthetic,  while not itself  part  of  a
knowing experience, is nevertheless the element of experience that makes knowledge
gathering possible. The aesthetic needs therefore, notwithstanding its separateness from
the field of a knowing experience, to be capable of integration within the whole of the
cognitive apparatus (broadly conceived) of the mind’s engagement with the environment.
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On  my  reading,  the  role  of  the  aesthetic  in  Dewey’s  account  of  inquiry  is  as  a
transcendental condition for knowing encounters.
14 It is important to Dewey that this sense of itch falls outwith the frame of our conceptual
take on things. It is a sense of itch that makes things salient. It is, however, difficult to see
how  this  notion  of  salience  can  make  sense  without  the  idea  of  the  ‘itch’  being  a
disturbance within a patterning to experience. At the same time, the sense of patterning
is not yet a conceptual patterning. To make sense of this idea we need the resources for
attributing a patterning to experience, something that can be disrupted. This is what
people mean when they speak of the role of  the noncognitive in Dewey’s account of
aesthetic experience (Alexander 2014). The label ‘noncognitive’ is, however, unhelpful. If
there is a real point to some such element of experience, then it is something that is
handled by human cognitive resources. For sure, it is something that falls outwith the
scope  of  conceptual  content  and  to  deny  that  would  be  to  run  the  risk  of  over-
intellectualising experience – something Dewey repeatedly warned against.5 That makes
the aesthetic difficult to capture in our description of the phenomenology of experience
and it can seem to render it invisible to the tools of analytic philosophy.6 But that last
point is mistaken. The idea of a notion of aesthetic experience that falls outwith the
conceptual content familiar to our ordinary notion of meaning is challenging to describe,
but we should not thereby take it as challenging to theorise. If we do not theorise about it
with care and attention, then we forfeit the right to deploy it in an account of the logic of
inquiry that informs pedagogy. 
15 I take the idea of a trajectory from ‘itch to fit’ as a serious attempt to understand Dewey’s
dynamic  concept  of  inquiry.  My  project  is  to  provide  a  theoretical  account  of  this
trajectory and make it  serviceable for  a  fundamental  re-shaping of  pedagogy.  Before
outlining some of the detail of the theoretical account of the trajectory from ‘itch to fit,’ I
want to set out the methodological options.  Understanding Dewey, let alone learning
from him, requires care regarding our methodological assumptions just as much as the
assumptions that shape our substantive ideas.
 
1. Methodology
16 There are two issues on which I  want to set-out my stand before embarking on the
detailed argument.  The first  issue concerns the sort  of  argument that  is  involved in
appealing to the aesthetics of experience. The second issue concerns how my account of
the aesthetics sits with the common presumption that Dewey’s theory of inquiry involves
a form of social constructivism (e.g. Carr 2003: 123 f.; and Fesmire 2015: 90 f.). I start with
the first issue.
17 If we are interested in the aesthetics of experience, here are two key questions: (i) What is
the aesthetic? (ii) What’s the argument for this element of experience? On the first point,
the aesthetic concerns elements of experience that must not be over-intellectualised, for
there  is  an  intrinsic  indeterminateness  to  the  aesthetic  in  experience.  The  aesthetic
concerns  the  itch  that  demands  our  attention,  an  unsettlingness  that  demands  a
response. So we need a theory of the ‘itch.’ For the moment, this is what I mean by the
aesthetic in Dewey’s account. For sure, lots of what counts as ‘aesthetic’ gets rendered
into the conceptual frame of thought and talk. For now, I use ‘aesthetic’ as a more neutral
term where others use ‘noncognitive’ (Alexander 2014). Neither term is fully satisfactory,
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but ‘noncognitive’ suggests a distance from cognition that renders opaque the idea that
the aesthetic of the itch provides a condition for the possibility of cognition’s inquiry.
18 The aesthetic  itch is  what Dewey had in mind when he says that  not  all  experience
involves  knowing.7 That  can  suggest  that  the  answer  to  the  second  question  is  a
phenomenological argument. It will be an argument that broadly works along the line of:
‘Look see. This is how it is. Don’t over-describe it or you run the risk of intellectualising
it.’ But that is too quick, for our two questions are quite distinct. In terms of what it is, the
aesthetic cannot be captured too accurately in the terminology of modern theories of
experiential content without losing its phenomenological indeterminacy. But with regard
to the argument for it, we need more than a descriptive claim, for we need, as theorists,
to be able to give a clear account of the role of the aesthetic. If we can’t deliver that, then
we’re just mumbling in the dark. Giving a clear theoretical account of the aesthetic does
not mean we over-intellectualise it, but it does mean we have to give an intellectually
cogent account of its role and how it integrates with knowing experience and why it is
important. Let’s start with that last point.
19 On a phenomenological account, the aesthetic is important because it is required for an
account  of  experience to  be  full  and complete.  That  is  how experience is:  it  has  an
aesthetic element. On the argument I want to explore, the aesthetic is important because
it provides the condition for the possibility of inquiry; it provides the account of that
which  renders  inquiry  possible  and  which  motivates  the  search  for  meaning  and
understanding  –  that  which  invites  us  to  adapt. And  yet,  faithfulness  to  the
phenomenology of the aesthetic means that we owe an account of something that in itself
does  not  provide  meaning  and  understanding.  So  we  need  sufficient  theoretical
granularity  to  our  account  of  the  aesthetic  that  will  support  the  argument  that  its
existence  is  a  condition  for  the  possibility  of  inquiry  while  also  accommodating  a
phenomenology that does not leave it over-intellectualised. We need to talk precisely and
with theoretical  detail  in a way that gives traction to that which is  not precise.  The
theoretical mode of discourse cannot compete with the phenomenological appeal but it
needs to legitimise the importance of the phenomenological appeal. Put simply, providing
the phenomenology of the Deweyan aesthetic might be an exercise that risks slipping
through the net of mainstream analytic philosophy, but providing the theorist’s account
of what it is and why it matters is part of the core business of any credible detailed theory
of  experience.  The  former  project  looks  to  estrange  Dewey  from  the  concerns  of
contemporary philosophy; the latter brings him home.
20 The second methodological  issue that  I  want to note concerns the status of  Dewey’s
constructivism. There is little doubt that Dewey’s concept of experience is broader than
the  model  of  perception  as  knowledge  gathering  that  dominates  contemporary
philosophy.  As  Alexander  (2014:  66)  notes,  “experience”  in  Dewey’s  sense  is  not
“perception” but  adaptive existence,  which in human existence takes in the form of
culture.
21 There are two point at stake here. The first is the point already noted, experience has a
dimension that I am calling the aesthetic. This is a dimension that is only problematically
captured if one tries to conceive it in terms of contemporary theories of experiential
content,  regardless  of  one’s  willingness  to  add  ‘nonconceptual  content’  alongside
conceptual content, or to add a relationalist model of experience to the contentful. One
thing that is signaled by ‘culture’ is the indeterminacy of experience that characterises
the aesthetic.  It’s  the point that “not all  experience is experience-as-known and that
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having  experience  arises  and  terminates  within  experience  that  is  not knowing”
(Alexander 2014: 71). But there is another element to the appeal to experience as culture,
and that’s the social dimension to the construction of culture that many find in Dewey.
Alexander again:
We do not begin our inquiries […] except under certain defining situations. Unless
one has lived and interacted with others, learning a language and participating in a
culture with its  stories  and traditions,  one cannot  even begin asking questions.
(Alexander 2012: 89)
22 There are a number of issues in this passage. Here are two issues that will dominate in my
argument.
23 First,  Alexander presents inquiry beginning with questions.  That cannot be right,  for
‘questions’ do not belong within the domain of the aesthetic. Alexander is well aware of
the point and has done much to present Dewey’s concept of inquiry as driven by the non-
cognitive. Nevertheless, the use of the idea of ‘question’ here shows the extent of the
difficulties we encounter in trying to give a coherent and detailed account of how inquiry
starts with the indeterminate ‘itch’ within the aesthetics of experience. I provide a theory
of the aesthetic ‘itch’ in the next two sections.
24 Second, Alexander here gives clear expression to a sense of dependency on situatedness
in culture as a precondition for asking questions and beginning inquiry. Inquiry is always
situated in a shared culture.8 It’s not clear to me in what sense Dewey endorses this idea
of inquiry’s situatedness in shared culture. I shall develop a reading of Dewey that sees
the shared culture  as  a  construct  of  earlier  phases  of  inquiry.  It  is  a  construct  that
scaffolds later stages, but the shared culture is the product of a more basic notion of
culture that is found in the individual’s aesthetics of experience. That is the order of
explanation that I offer in my reading of Dewey. I will note the reasons for this as the
argument proceeds, but it is important to mark now that although at any stage of inquiry
shared culture scaffolds the following stage, the role of shared culture is not constitutive
of inquiry but a result  of  the basic form of inquiry that is  individualistic both in its
problems and its aesthetics. The root to culture is individual, not shared and it is due to
those roots that we acquire shared culture. Shared culture is an explanandum,  not the
explanans.  I  am  assuming  that  individual  transformation  is  the  motor  of  the  social
transformation, not the other way around.
25 The individualism in my reading of Dewey will jar many people’s sense of his emphasis on
the  social,  the  cultural  and  the  intrinsically  democratising  drive  of  his  vision  of
education. With regard to the political and social impact of Dewey’s concept of inquiry I
have no problem. My emphasis on the individual notion of culture is an explanatory
device. The priority I see in the individual is an explanatory one. There is not space in this
essay to treat this aspect of methodology in adequate detail, but let me mark one root to a
social constructivist account of Dewey with which I take issue.
26 It is tempting to think that there are at least two senses of problem. The individual’s
problems and society’s problems. Problems are the root to learning. So what drives an
individual’s  learning?  The  answer,  presumably,  is  their  problems.  If  we  find  the
individual’s problems as those that they inherit from initiation into socially constructed
problems, then the source of individual learning is simply the problems inherited by their
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initiation  into  the  current  cultural  forms.  But  that  hides  the  following  diagnostic
possibility – the idea of a meta-problem with educational thinking:
• The  meta-problem  with  educational  thought  and  policy  is  that  it  is  not  driven  by  an
adequate conception of the problems that drive individual learners – it has no account of
individuals’ problems.
27 If individuals’ problems are socially constructed (what you pick up from initiation into
culture) there is no such meta-problem. But that means that the potential for a Deweyan
critique of instrumentalism about education is wholly dependent on how you draft the
problems you inherit on initiation into culture. And that is highly contentious. One way
of seeing the bearing of Dewey on European educational thought in the 21st century is to
focus on the issue: what are Europe’s problems? And that takes us into a long, although
potentially interesting series of empirical and policy issues about European education. My
argument is located in a different set of concerns. My central claim is that there is a
fundamental flaw in educational thinking that Dewey can help us expose and that the
exposure  provides  a  powerful  individualist  cognitive  account  of  why  the  aesthetic
matters at the heart of our thinking about and practice of education.
28 This is a different route to the familiar broadly social constructivist reading of Dewey. It
is the route that takes the meta-problem seriously and finds leverage on the critique of
instrumentalism by rooting the critique in an analysis of the concept of ‘problem’ as it
figures at the level of the individual learner. My central claim is that Dewey has the
resources for a conception of the individual’s problem that drives inquiry. That notion of
problem is framed by his account of the aesthetics of experience. Learning begins by
confronting  a  problem  framed  within  aesthetics,  an  account  of  experience  that  is
intrinsically open-ended although patterned. This is an account that explains the deep
source of Dewey’s pragmatism – the fact that learning is always situated in real historical
time. Learning is timely, not timeless. It is the process by which we smooth the itches in
current experience and prepare ourselves for what comes next, where what comes next is
invariably open-ended and unpredictable. This is a process that we must face not with
rules and prior commitments other than a preparedness to interrogate openly and freely




29 Inquiry starts with a problem. Depending on how we think of problems, this can seem
banal and trivial or challenging but elusive. If a problem is identified with a question, the
resulting concept of inquiry is trivial and misses Dewey’s main concern. Here’s a first
rough way of marking out how the concept of problem can play an important explanatory
role in inquiry.
30 Contrast two different models of problem solving:
a. problem-solving in terms of working out the consequences of what is already known; 
b. problem-solving as learning, as a source for extending cognition.
31 The  first  sense  is  trivial.  It  takes  problem  solving  as  little  more  than  moving  the
conceptual furniture into fresh positions. Many of the things we do in education involve
conceptual tidying,  but this involves a conception of problem-solving in terms of re-
arranging  of  what  is  already  known  into  a  new configuration,  a  superficial  kind  of
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cognitive  make-over.  Problem-solving  in  this  sense  is  exemplified  in  doing  basic
arithmetic, for example, let the problem be: what’s 68 + 57?10
32 The contrast between problems in type (a) and (b) might look too binary, for what about
‘real problems’ as, e.g. in ‘real maths’? That’s a good point in the context of pedagogic
policy, but the notion of ‘real’ here means roughly ‘matters in some way to the pupil.’ It is
true that there is a sense of that which is, in policy terms, important for gaining pupils’
attention, focus in behaviour, commitment to work, etc. There is also, underlying that,
the sense of ‘mattering to the pupil’ that I want to get into focus and that’s the sense of
mattering in which the pupil is met with a disruption that demands their attention, a
disruption that engages them as inquirer, not simply as a task that is interesting. So ‘real
maths’ is important if it offers interesting tasks rather than abstract tasks – agreed. But it
is  theoretically  important  if  those ‘interesting tasks’  are not  just  interesting because
anchored in some concepts that are key to the pupil (counting change due in a purchase
rather  than  just  adding  numbers  in  the  abstract),  but  are  enthralling  because  they
present to the pupil an experience or set of experiences that disrupt and reveal new
domains to experience that in turn produces cognitive growth – learning.
33 The second sense of problem-solving is the challenging and elusive one. It requires a
concept  of  a  problem that  arises  out  of  a  disruption  to  experience  but  where  that
disruption is  not  presented within the  conceptual  resources  already available  to  the
learner. It requires a notion of a disruption that can unsettle the learner and drive them
into the work of inquiry, but the challenge it presents must be one that opens up new
experiences and new concepts, otherwise no real learning will take place. I am assuming
here that  ‘learning’  requires  a  transition that  delivers  cognitive  enhancement;  at  its
simplest, the acquisition of new concepts. It is the idea of a disruption in experience that
demands  attention  and  demands  the  work of  learning  that  is  key  to  understanding
Dewey’s concept of problem. Whatever else we may say about Dewey, it is clear that the
notion of problem-solving he requires is type (b) above.
34 Dewey is clear that problem-solving involves more than mere tasks, it is the means for
extending cognition. Problem-solving arises from the things that unsettle us:
The unsettled  or  indeterminate  situation might  have  been called  a  problematic
situation. This name would have been, however,  proleptic and anticipatory.  The
indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected
to  inquiry.  The  indeterminate  situation  comes  into  existence  from  existential
causes,  just  as  does,  say,  the  organic  imbalance  of  hunger.  There  is  nothing
intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they are the
necessary conditions of cognitive operations or inquiry. (LW 12: 111)
35 In this passage we have all the key ingredients for understanding Dewey’s concept of
inquiry as problem-solving. Problems arise outwith the scope of intellectual or cognitive
experience, they arise from a natural imbalance in our engagement with the environment
(akin to hunger).  This  is  a  problematic  situation.  Problematic  situations demand our
attention,  our  inquisitiveness.  Problematic  situations  are  the  necessary  condition for
inquiry. A problem is a ‘partial transformation’ of a problematic situation. As Dewey goes
on to say,
A  problem  represents  the  partial  transformation  by  inquiry  of  a  problematic
situation into a determinate situation. It is a familiar and significant saying that a
problem well put is half-solved. (LW 12: 111-2)
36 The key concept in all this is that of the problematic-situation. Without that, problems
become mere intellectual games with the “semblance but not the substance of scientific
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activity” (LW 12: 112). It is the concept of a problematic situation that provides the drive
to inquiry and identifies the end-point to any given inquiry which is found in conversion
of the problematic indeterminacy into a sense of unity. Hence Dewey’s official definition
of inquiry:
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation
into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to
convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole. (LW 12: 108)
37 Dewey’s concept of a problematic situation is,  in outline,  clear enough, but it  has an
inbuilt  imbalance in its  conception,  reflected in Dewey’s  observation that  to call  the
situation ‘problematic’ is anticipatory. He says this, for in calling it ‘problematic’ we have
already started to respond cognitively to the disruption and to begin to formulate it as a
problem.  But  the  unsettling  disruption  must  be  separate  from  such  beginnings  of
cognitive response, or else the cognitive response, the first formulations of a problem,
would  not  be  one  undertaken  in  response  to  the  disruption  that  the  indeterminate
situation presents  in experience.  I  think it  is  clearer,  therefore,  if  we see the initial
experience as involving a simple sense of disruption. That is the key to what Dewey calls a
‘problematic situation’; there is something that unsettles us. The unsettling character is
independent of how we respond to it and begin to treat it as a problem. Our challenge as
theorists is to make sense of this initial unsettling character to experience.11
38 In summary, we have the following key ingredients to Dewey’s concept of inquiry:
39 Outline of Inquiry:
i. A situation can be salient to us independent of our knowing/conceptual encounters with it.
ii. Salience arises from a disruption to our expectations, where these are understood as part of
a more primitive and natural mode of engagement with things than a knowing/conceptual
engagement.
iii. Resolution of such disruptions arises when the situation is rendered into a unified whole.
40 If we can make sense of the ideas of salience and expectations independent of knowing
conceptual encounters with things, we will then have a model of inquiry as problem-
solving  as  the  source  for  extending  cognition.  Problem-solving  thus  conceived  will
provide  the  basis  for  learning  as  a  transformative  enhancement  to  the  expressive
repertoire of cognition.
41 What I  want to argue is  that  Dewey’s  concept  of  salience in terms of  disruptions to
expectations involves operations within the aesthetics of experience. This provides an
account of  experience  more  primitive  than  the  knowing  conceptual  encounters.  In
addition, although it is not obvious from the summary above, the sense of ‘unified whole’
that is achieved at the resolution of a problematic situation is also a contribution to the
aesthetics of experience. Inquiry begins and ends in aesthetics. Once we can see how to
make sense of these claims, we will  also have the resources to see how the aesthetic
figures throughout in what I shall call the craft of inquiry. It is tempting to think that the
only role for the notion of a nonconceptual salience is as the kick-start to inquiry. Then,
once a disruptive situation takes on a conceptual form as it becomes a problem-situation,
concepts take over and the resulting unification is also a conceptual  ordering of  the
initial  disruptive  experience.  That  is  not,  however,  Dewey’s  position.  For  Dewey,  the
aesthetic  is  not  only  the  necessary  condition  for  inquiry,  it  is  also  the  underlying
background to conceptual encounters. It is what Dewey called, “our constant sense of
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things, as belonging or not belonging, of relevancy, a sense which is immediate [not] the
product of reflection” (LW 10: 198).
42 This background is in all experience and when it is foregrounded, it provides what Dewey
calls ‘an experience’ – that’s the consummatory experience that provides the sense of
unity at the resolution of disruption. It is akin to the sense of ‘an experience’ when the
background expectations and saliences are foregrounded in works of art.12 The task then
is to provide sufficient detail to the nature of the aesthetic to begin to make sense of how




43 Dewey needs a coherent concept of salience. That much is clear. It needs to provide a
means of engaging with situations independent of conceptual engagements that provide
the content to cognition. The obvious move at this point is to treat the concept of salience
that Dewey needs as either a return to the myth of the given or to see it as an instance of
an appeal to a notion of nonconceptual content to experience.13 Both options are fraught
with  difficulties  not  least  of  which  is  the  familiar  conundrum:  how  can  a  level  of
experience that is devoid of conceptual content give rise to concepts? But the familiar
problems here arise in part because we have not heeded Dewey’s insights. If you set up
the problem in terms of how nonconceptual content gives rise to conceptual content, you
have  ignored  Dewey’s  claim  about  the  indeterminacy  involved  in  salience.  The
unsettlingness  of  a  problematic  situation  is  not  just  a  matter  of  a content  (albeit  a
nonconceptual  one)  not  being  satisfied.  The  notion  of  unsettlingness  is  not  so
determinate. I prefer then not to try to capture the concept of salience in content terms
at all, but simply to say that salience at the level of aesthetic of experience arises when a
pattern is disrupted. There are two things that need to hold with respect to the notion of
pattern for it to capture the concept of salience that Dewey needs. First, the notion of
pattern must make sense of the indeterminacy of disruption that Dewey wants; second
the notion of pattern need not itself contribute to the content of experience. It is not
necessary to treat the pattern involved here as itself an element within experience; what
is necessary is that the disruption is an element of experience. I treat the second point
first. 
44 If experience can make things salient due to a disruption, an ‘unsettlingness,’ then that
must be because a pattern that the subject expects has been disrupted. It is difficult to see
how we could make sense of disruption without crediting the experiencing subject with
some sort of expectation of a pattern. But that does not commit us to treating the pattern,
let alone the subject’s expectation of the pattern, as themselves elements of experience.
For  example,  a  loose  floorboard  is  salient  when  you  step  on  it.  It  thwarts  your
expectations about the rigidity of the floor you are crossing, but it is an unnecessary
extravagance to make such expectations a component of phenomenology as you walk
across the floor. There need be no ‘way that you experience the floor’ as a component of
your experience as you walk over a stable floor. It is only when you step on the loose
board that  experience changes and you become aware of  the board.  And even then,
although the loose board becomes salient because a pattern of expectations regarding
solidity has been disrupted, there is no need to treat that pattern (the ‘way the board is
picked out’) as itself an element of experience. It is enough if we treat the board itself as
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the item of awareness and experience; that is, we have a direct relational awareness of
the loose board brought about by the disruption to a pattern of solidity. The pattern need
only register  at  the sub-personal  level  of  experience as  something that  the subject’s
cognitive  machinery  monitors.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  phenomenology  of
experience, the solidity of the floor is silent. We say that the subject expects the floor to
be solid, but that does not commit us to thinking the subject’s experience is awash with
representations of the floor’s solidity. It is enough if their sub-personal cognitive systems
represent solidity and, when the expectations of those systems are thwarted, an alarm is
registered in personal experience that makes the loose board an item of awareness. If we
reserve ‘content’ for that which is available to awareness, then the representation of the
patterns of solidity need not themselves ever become available to experience (cf. Luntley
2010 for this idea). 
45 The above suggestion does not take us very far in understanding Dewey. What it does is
remove the impulse to treat the patterns implicated in an account of expectations as
items of conscious experience. That is an important move, but it does not take us to the
heart of Dewey’s conception of disruption. Having patterns monitored by sub-personal
cognitive in silence and below the radar of conscious awareness does nothing to account
for a sense of disruption that captures the indeterminacy of which Dewey speaks. To
make sense of Dewey’s conception of what starts inquiry, we need not just a notion of
pattern that is, for the most part, monitored below the level of personal awareness, we
need a notion of pattern that, even if it becomes accessible to consciousness, delivers the
indeterminacy  that  Dewey  posits.  This  is  the  bit  that  seems  difficult,  but  it  is  the
component of Dewey’s thinking that shows why Kant was right to use the label ‘aesthetic’
for that which is a condition for judgement and also why what is so labeled figures in
those experiences characteristic of our engagement with art. The patterns implicated in
the  notion  of  disruptive  salience  are  patterns  that  enjoy  an  indeterminate  open-
endedness. We need to turn to sources different to standard theories of non-conceptual
content in order to make sense of Dewey’s concept of a problem.
 
4. The Sense of Fit
46 I want to appeal to recent work in both psychology and philosophy to begin to fill out a
theory of the kind of disruption that Dewey appears to have in mind. Carey (2009; see also
Carey et al. 2011) has set out a comprehensive developmental account of the acquisition of
number concepts. It is a bootstrapping theory. Like any bootstrapping theorist, Carey has
been criticised for failing to account for the transformative transition from possession of
the pre-cursors of  number concepts to grasp of  number concepts.  Any bootstrapping
theory that posits a form of experience that is weaker than a conceptually saturated
experience but which, nevertheless, is held to give rise to the latter will be met with the
outraged response: ‘How did you get all that out of so little?’ Hence the enduring appeal
of those who argue that the bootstrapping problem cannot be solved.14 But what can
make that response look inevitable is, in part, the poverty of our conception of what goes
into the form of experience that is precursor to the conceptually saturated one. And it is
here that Dewey has suggestions that dovetail with two otherwise separate initiatives in
contemporary research.
47 Carey does not dwell on the point, but she makes a key observation regarding her account
of  the  experiences  that  are  precursors  to  grasp  of  cardinality.  She  says  that  before
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children use numerals  to express  number concepts,  they use them akin to nonsense
words in strings like nursery rhymes and similar word games. So the sequence
1, 2, 3, 4…
is learnt as a string akin to
eeny, meeny, miny, mo.
48 The rhythm, rhyme and repetition of  sounds provides the young child with a use of
numerals where they serve as ‘placeholders’ for what will become numerical concepts. I
shall  ignore the issue of  what  resources are required to pull  off  the transition from
placeholders to concepts. My interest lies in understanding the starting point.15
49 A child who knows the sequence for the numerals as placeholders has a sense of pattern
to their use, a sense that draws upon formal features of strings found in their rhythm and
the repetition of this rhythm, often also involving rhyming games. The young child who
hears
1, 2, 3…
expects ‘4’ to come next. There is a pattern to their experience. If you said, ‘1, 2, 3, 5’ they
would experience it as wrong. But that notion of ‘wrong’ is not a content notion. It is not
a semantic sense of wrong; it is not that the sequence is false. The child may yet have no
sense of cardinality. Their sense that the sequence is wrong is just like their sense that
eeny, meeny, mo, miny
is wrong. This is wrong, but no semantic error is involved. Both ‘disruptive’ sequences are
sequences  that  are  experienced  as  disruptive.  This  does  not  seem  like  the  loose
floorboard. The child might be actively playing with rhyming sequences, enjoying the
counting rhymes, aware of the rhythms and rhymes displayed in the repetition and when
another child presents the disruptive sequence,  it  sounds wrong.  The challenge is  to
identify theoretically this notion of ‘wrong.’ Carey does not address the issue, but let’s
make some obvious moves.
50 The first  thing one might want to say is that anyone brought up with these rhymes
acquires a sense that, e.g.,  ‘mo’ comes after ‘miny.’16 It fits. The word belongs in that
position. We might say this: it is what you ‘ought’ to say after ‘miny’ in that sequence.
And the same applies to the use of ‘4’ after ‘3’ in the counting rhymes. The concept of ‘fit’
here picks out what Ginsborg calls primitive normativity (Ginsborg 2011). The concept of
primitive normativity involves a sense of ‘ought’ that characterises our experience of
various patterns. It is a phenomenologically real feature. It is primitive in two senses.
51 First, it contributes to a very basic form of experience involving our engagement with
various formal features of things, patterns of rhythm, rhyme, repetition in the case of
words; balance of hue and intensity with regard to colours, and patterns of line and shade
in graphic forms. These are properties that figure large in our experience of art objects,
but they figure in patterns that are importantly subjective. This is the second sense in
which the normativity of fit is primitive. The sense of fit that applies to the position of
‘mo’ after ‘miny’ is a sense of ought that lacks generality. It is a sense of how things are
experienced as belonging in my experience. That I find ‘mo’ belonging after ‘miny’ does
not mean that I thereby have resources for criticising you if you produce the sequence
Eeny, meeny, mo, miny.
52 I will find the sequence disruptive, but not with a sense of error that provides resource
for critiquing your performance.  Your performance will  jar.  It  will  sound wrong,  but
there is no semantic error involved. The error is an aesthetic error, your performance
does not fit in the patterns that I have come to expect in the use of these tokens. It is the
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lack of generality to the position occupied by ‘mo’ that betrays the fact that whatever
pattern is involved here, it is not a conceptual pattern.
53 A defining feature of conceptual content is that the bearers of such content exhibit a
generality with respect to the place they occupy within structures that carry conceptual
content.17 The word ‘four’ only carries the concept of the number between three and five
in  the  series  of  natural  numbers  when  it  figures  in  patterns  of  use  that  make  its
applicability correct of sets of things that share the same cardinality, namely they all
have four members. As a concept bearing device, the word ‘four’ carries a conceptual
content when it has a role applicable to groups of apples, of people, the suits in whist, the
riders  of  the  apocalypse,  and  so  on.  The  word  ‘mo’  exhibits  no  such  generality  of
application.  The sense of  ‘ought’  governing the fit  of  ‘mo’  in the nonsense rhyme is
therefore quite unlike any sense of ‘ought’ that might be thought applicable to the use of
content bearing words when used in adherence to standards of semantic correctness. The
objectivity of such standards is manifest in the generality of application that provides the
resources to critique others’ usage if, e.g., they use ‘four’ when only three riders go by.
54 The idea of primitive normativity opens up scope for a rich structure to experience that
populates a good part of the things we ordinarily treat within the aesthetic. The idea of
the sense of fit as a subjective ‘ought’ captures that part of our experience 
of things that finds a heftedness, a sense of belonging and order to experience in the
absence  of  rules  and  objective  demands  upon  patterns.  It  introduces  patterns  that,
although oftentimes accompanied with a strong sense of ‘fit’  are, by any sense, quite
open-ended and amenable to playful imaginative extension. These are patterns with their
accompanying sense of fit that are, nevertheless, open to agential modification. Like the
paths we tread when walking across open country, these are patterns to which we feel
some sense of allegiance – we respect the path as worn by previous walkers – but we are
not beholden to them or to anything else to always walk in just the same way.18
55 In  short,  the  sense  of  salience  that  I  think  Dewey  needs  is  found in  the  disruption
experienced in the sequence
Eeny, meeny, mo, miny.
56 The sequence thwarts our expectation. But there is no determinate sense of error here,
for the notion of fit that has been transgressed has no generality to it. For sure a sequence
that retained the rhyme but replaced the last word,
Eeny, meeny miny, oh
might not jar as much, but it still does not fit; it lacks the repetition of the em sound
expected as the lead consonant to the last three words of the sequence. The
indeterminacy is manifest also in the adaptability of fit. The disruptive sequence can be
rendered fit by adopting the varied rhyming scheme and placing it within an extended
instance of the rhythmic pattern with,
eeeny, meeny, mo, miny
mine is big and yours is tiny.
57 Such examples are commonplace in the playful  engagement with rhythm and rhyme
found in young children’s early encounters with language.19
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5. Fit, Work, and Closure
58 The appeal  to  the  idea of  fit  gives  theoretical  purchase  on the ‘itch,’  the  disruptive
irritant that starts inquiry and which, when attended to, provides us with a problematic
situation. With the idea of an experience that jars our sense of fit, we have the starting
point to inquiry. There is much more to be said about how to develop the detail of the
cognitive  dynamics  of  this  reading  of  Dewey’s  account  of  inquiry.  But  we  have  the
beginnings of a reading of Dewey that permits theoretical development in laying out the
trajectory of an individual’s engagement with inquiry that offers explanatory leverage on
what is going on, rather than merely descriptive comfort.
59 Dewey has inquiry starting with an indeterminate situation and resolving when this is
transformed into a ‘unified whole.’ Part of what is implicated in the end point of any
inquiry will doubtless involve a conceptual unification, but I think Dewey intended the
sense of closure and wholeness at the terminus of inquiry to mean much more than that.
On  the  reading  that  I  have  indicated,  the  closure  is  also  part  of  the  aesthetics  of
experience. The slogan I offered was to consider inquiry as the dynamic from ‘itch to fit.’
The disruptive ‘itch’ is theorised as the loss of fit. It is proper then to see the conclusion of
inquiry as the return to a sense of fit. That is the idea that is clear in Dewey’s conception
of inquiry as a dynamic that restores a balance to our engagement with the environment
that was unsettled by the problematic situation.
60 In his account of our experience of art, Dewey makes explicit appeal to the notion of ‘an
experience’ and I think that is best understood on the model that I am promoting as an
appreciation of fit. There are many ways of responding to art objects and many of them
involve  ascription  of  content  to  the  objects,  whether  words,  patches  of  paint  or
movements of a dancer. But some of the ways of responding to art objects that seem
central  to  many  aesthetic  experiences  involve  the  response  that  comes  from  an
appreciation of  the  formal  properties  of  fit.  Apt  vocabulary  choices  can provide  the
novelist with a sentence whose individual words are hefted in each other’s company in a
way that alerts us to the cadence available when words are handled by writers with a
craftiness for finding fit. Or consider the resonance of colours in a Malevich abstract, or
the thrum of the etched lines and scratchings in the paint in a Ravilious landscape. There
are lots of moments when our experience of art draws upon our sense of fit, when the
artist provides an arrangement of words, colour or line that brings to our attention the
way some patterns can be enjoyed for their sense of fit, whatever other purpose they may
also serve. One of the things art can do when it provides what Dewey calls ‘an experience’
is bring to the surface the patterns that provide some of our most basic expectations in
experience,  the  patterns  whose  disruption  prompts  inquiry.  How natural,  then,  that
inquiry should end in the resolution of those disruptions, in an experience in which the
aesthetic order is, for the time being at least, restored.20
61 And all this is natural in a sense that is central to Dewey’s philosophy. It is natural, for it
draws upon features of our experience that fall within a naturalistic account of inquiry as
a dynamic between the rhythm of disruption and fit in our sense of aesthetic patterns.
The account is,  in this  respect,  properly on a par with the dynamic from hunger to
satiation of need in our pursuit of food. What is natural for our species is the ‘hunger’ for
patterns that fit. The idea of primitive normativity is the idea of a sense of ‘ought’ that is
subjective. It is, however, not idle. It is not subjective in the way that colour or value are
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sometimes taken to be subjective in error-theories of those properties. The ‘ought’ of fit is
subjective, for it is part of how we respond to regularities, but it is a natural response for
creatures like us.  And that we have this response does explanatory work in our self-
understanding, for it is because we respond to patterns with a sense of fit that we seek
out patterns, that we adjust them when they are disrupted, that we create new extensions
of them when their course dries up. It is our aesthetic sense of fit that is a key driver in
the pursuit of pattern making and pattern sustenance. And that, at heart, is the idea
running through Dewey’s theory of inquiry.
62 The dynamic from itch to fit is not, in itself, a knowing dynamic. It is not a trajectory of
conceptual  organisation.  It  is  a  naturalistically  conceived  dynamic.  It  is,  however,  I
suggest, the necessary condition for the emergence of conceptual organisation. Making
good on that suggestion is work for another occasion, but it is important to note that
even if that claim can be substantiated, it does not remove the aesthetic dynamic from
inquiry; it does not get supplanted by the conceptual dynamic, rather it contributes to it.
 
6. The Craft of Inquiry
63 I have suggested a reading of Dewey that provides a naturalistic theory of inquiry. I have
used resources from contemporary research to provide a reading of Dewey’s concept of
inquiry that provides explanatory purchase on the dynamic from itch to fit. The appeal to
the  aesthetics  of  experience  in  characterising  the  initial  ‘itch’  does  not  exhaust  the
explanatory project I am grafting onto Dewey’s theory of inquiry. The aesthetic plays an
important role in concluding inquiry, but it also figures in the ongoing culture of inquiry.
The work of inquiry also has room for the aesthetics of experience. I want to close with
some brief  remarks on the phenomenology of  inquiry.  The details  of  the theoretical
model  that  I  am recommending  require  more  space  and  the  explanatory  project  of
working  through  the  detail  of  the  theoretical  model  sketched  must  wait  on  other
occasions. But if the approach is plausible, what does it capture in the phenomenology of
inquiry? The answer, I think, is that it provides some important observations about what
we might call the ‘craft of inquiry.’ It also gives credence to Dewey’s recommendation
that it is the imagination that is the hallmark of human action, and the mark of teaching
that is more than merely mechanical.21
64 When confronted with an initial itch, the unsettlingness that once attended to provides
the sense of a problematic situation, it is not obvious how one should respond. As Dewey
observes, ‘a problem well put is half-solved.’ But what, then, is it to put a problem well?
Clearly, at a minimum, it is something like this: it is to frame the question(s) that drive
inquiry in a way that permits solution. But that just invites a further question, ‘What is it
to frame a question?’ What is the initial move by which an itch is taken up by cognition?
There are lots of things to be said about this, but I want to sketch some ideas that seem to
me to illuminate aspects of the phenomenology of inquiry that we rarely talk about,
aspects that are themselves part of the aesthetics of experience.
65 An itch is  a  disruption in a  pattern of  expectations that  lacks the generality  due to
conceptual patterns. We are unsettled by the disruption. So where there’s an itch, there’s
a  breach  in  an  aesthetic  pattern.  By  its  nature,  the  pattern  breached  provides  no
resources for handling the sense of itch, for there is no generality to the position in the
pattern where the breach occurs. So if it feels like a breach, we need other resources to
heal the sense of disruption. One option is the simple playful one in which we capture the
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breach and make it a moment within a different sense of fit. This is the move that is
rampant in children’s play with words. It is the move that seals the breach in
eeny, meeny, mo, miny
by offering the new pattern,
eeny, meeny, mo, miny
mine is big, yours is tiny.
66 Many breaches are settled in that way, but that is not the way of inquiry, it is the way of
aesthetic improvisation. In inquiry, the task is to repair the breach with a response that
offers understanding. Inquiry therefore demands, of the inquirer, some grasp of concepts
and some thirst  for applying them.22 That  means that  when inquiry moves to seal  a
breach in the aesthetic pattern, the move at stake is to find some general pattern to
repair  the  breach.  There  is  no  recipe  for  selecting  the  general  pattern,  other  than
improvisation, the experimentation with ways of treating the breach as an instance not
just of a new fit pattern, but of a pattern that is general.
67 If  something  like  this  is  right,  what  moral  does  it  suggest  with  regard  to  the
phenomenology  of  inquiry?  I  think  it  suggests  that  we  should  expect  to  find  the
phenomenology  of  inquiry  manifest  as  an  imaginative  and  oftentimes  playful
experimentation  with  the  aesthetic  forms  of  experience.  Of  course,  we  identify
hypotheses,  we  test  them  by  checking  their  consequences  for  observation  and  the
inferential shadow they cast over our web of beliefs. But we also judge them with respect
to how well they fit with some of our deepest cultural bearings, the intellectual myths
and presumptions that reflect some of the shape of the aesthetics of experience. What
does this mean? Here’s a simple example.
68 Think of the experience common to many academics on grading student papers: early on
in reading the paper, perhaps as early as the first couple of paragraphs, you form a view
about  the  intelligence  on  offer  and  the  grade  due.  Some  academics  are  shy  of
acknowledging this point, for it might reflect an improper rush bordering on prejudice to
admit such views arising so early. I think, however, acknowledging it tells us something
important about the culture of inquiry. Our early initial judgement might be due to the
fact that the student is posing exactly the right questions and making our favoured first
inferences in evaluating them. But I  think it  is  rarely that simple.  I  suspect there is
something real and important to the thought that what you are responding to,  what
makes you think that there is an intelligent voice present in the paper with an impressive
grip on things, is that the writing exhibits a sense of fit in their formulation of the key
problem. It is the thought we might express by saying something like, ‘it hangs together.’
If so, I suggest that whatever conceptual unity we might be commenting on, there is also
and underlying that, an aesthetic unity. This is something that can be salient early on
and, of course, one might later revise one’s view on this.
69 Think of the phenomenology of engaging in inquiry, e.g., the phenomenology of writing a
paper. How is for you when you start on a research paper? When I started this paper, I did
not know that I would write this section on the craft of inquiry. That came later. Did I not
know what I was doing when I started? If so, that might betray a lack of foresight on my
part,  but  I  suspect  a  more  honest  and  interesting  answer  reflects  a  common  and
important way of working. We work in inquiry by playing around with the itch – the
sense of what bothers us and we gesture towards a sense of what might settle us. Then we
experiment and play around with ways of framing the problem. Sometimes, it  comes
clear very quickly. We crank the handle and churn out the essay, but most of the time, it
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is  not  like  that.  Most  of  the time,  it  takes  work,  graft  and craft  that  is  much more
exploratory  and  playful  than  simply  doing  the  analysis  and  running  through  the
inferences. Learning involves a trial and error strategy not just in the narrow analytic
sense  of  conjectures  and  refutations,  but  in  the  adjustments  to  the  aesthetics  of
experience, the imaginative and playful experimenting with the aesthetic form of things
until we arrive at a formulation of a problem that delivers the fecundity appropriate for
serious cognitive work (MW 9:  245 f.).  Even then,  there is  a  considerable to and fro
between  careful  analysis  and  derivation  of  the  consequence  of  assumptions  and
theoretical posits and the crafty manoeuvrings of the domain of fit.
70 The  reading  of  Dewey  that  I  am  offering  is  not  based  on  the  appeal  to  these
phenomenological observations. It is based on the explanatory work that the aesthetics of
experience enables in providing an understanding of the dynamic from itch to fit. But
that explanatory work gains credence if it offers legitimacy to a phenomenology of the
craft of inquiry that, to my mind, rings true.
 
7. The Problem with Dewey
71 I  have outlined a  reading of  Dewey that  takes  seriously  the  project  of  providing an
explanatory account of how inquiry is driven by problems. Inquiry is learning. Learning is
driven by, brought to rest by and, arguably, its many modes of operations are replete
with, manouevrings in the aesthetics of experience. If that is what learning is, we have no
pedagogy fit for learning if we do not place the provision of the aesthetics of experience
at the heart of our pedagogy. Engagement with the aesthetics of experience is much more
than a motivational  ‘extra,’  a  boost  to the cognitive enterprise,  a  means for framing
interest,  attention and motivation in the learner.  Engagement  with the aesthetics  of
experience is the condition for the very possibility of learning. The theory of pedagogy
needs to start with aesthetics.
72 Educators  acknowledge  this.23 Policy-makers  normally  dare  not,  for  the  aesthetics  is
messy, hard to plot, intractable to modern management methods, invariably lost to the
schedules of accounting targets, and so on. But if the aesthetics of experience does seem
messy to the mindset of 21st century policy makers in education, no matter, for inquiry
is,  by their lights,  messy.  That’s the point.  That’s the problem with Dewey.  And it  is
perhaps  a  gesture  towards  an  explanation  of  why  the  transformative  inquiries  of
individuals require a transformation in our social spaces so that they provide conjoint
common experienes. There is no telling where the messiness of problems will lead, nor
where the resources for fit might be found. Such messiness is a problem with Dewey, but
it’s a problem we should celebrate and proclaim and by so doing begin to reshape our
conception of  what pedagogy might become when once we understand how learning
happens.
Thanks to the editors of this special volume for giving me the opportunity to expand my initial
paper and for their helpful suggestions in this regard.
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NOTES
1. References to John Dewey’s published works are to the critical edition, The Collected Works of
John Dewey,  1882-1953,  edited by Boydston J. A.,  Carbondale and Edwardsville,  Southern Illinois
University Press, 1967-1991, and published in three series as The Early Works 1882-1899 [EW], The
Middle Works 1899-1924 [MW], and The Later Works 1925-1953 [LW].
2. See  Nussbaum  2009  for  a  recent  appeal  to  Dewey  for  the  resources  to  combat  the
instrumentalism rampant in much educational policy.
3. See Alexander 2012, 2014 and Leddy 2015, although neither quite capture the central role for
the aesthetic that I envisage.
4. See Zeltner (1975: 18-21).
5. “There  is  nothing  intellectual  or  cognitive  in  the  existence  of  [problematic]  situations,
although they are the necessary conditions of  cognitive operations or inquiry” (LW 12:  111).
Alexander (2014: 71) notes: “Not all experience is experience as known […] knowing experience
arises and terminates within experience that is not knowing.”
6. Hence Alexander’s (2014) critique of linguistic pragmatism in favour of Dewey’s experiential
pragmatism and compare  Kitcher’s  (2014)  jibes  against  the  preoccupations  of  logic-chopping
philosophers who miss the pragmatist drive to “reconnect philosophy with life” (Ibid.: 99). Note
also that Kitcher links this with Dewey’s “worries about the detachment of art from everyday
life” (Ibid.: 100). Similar sentiments run through Kitcher 2012.
7. For Dewey, problematic situations are “precognitive” (LW 12: 111). And see Alexander (2014:
71):  “Not  all  experience  is  experience-as-known  and  that  knowing  experience  arises  and
terminates within experience that is not knowing.”
8. There are many forms of dependency on the social that figure in theories of learning; for a
critique of the influential Vygotskian version, see Luntley forthcoming.
9. Although this is individualistic and although I have noted points of contrast with Alexander’s
reading  of  Dewey,  I  agree  fully  with  the  main  thrust  of  his  reading  that  in  Dewey  we  find
something  usefully  called  ‘experiential  pragmatism’  in  contrast  to  the  linguistic  pragmatism
found  in  Brandom.  And  the  reason  for  this  lies  in  the  notion  of  the  “irreducibility  of  the
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noncognitive” (Alexander 2014: 65). I disagree with Alexander only on the detail of how to make
sense of the noncognitive (I prefer ‘aesthetic’), with the need to have a coherent and detailed
theoretical account of the aesthetic and the explanatory advantage in seeing the social aesthetic
arising out of the individual aesthetic. 
10. It is interesting to note that such problems are not, of course, problems at all, for unless
someone else asks you the question, ‘What is 68 + 57?,’ it has no obvious appeal; it does not, in the
abstract  demand attention.  This  sense  of  problem-solving  is  invariably  dependent  on  others
raising the question and is,  perhaps,  one reason for taking the social  turn in the account of
problems. Dewey contrasts arithmetical examples with real problems, arithmetical problems are,
he says, merely “tasks,” things set by others, cf. LW 12: Ch. 6, § II, esp. p. 111.
11. The challenge is, of course, the one that most contemporary philosophers think is incoherent
– the challenge of making sense of the ‘given’ as a pre-conceptual input to cognition, for classic
treatments  see  Sellars  1956;  McDowell  1994;  and Brandom 1994.  And that  is  why Brandom’s
version of pragmatism is a linguistic one, he thinks the option of an experiential pragmatism
would require returning to the myth of the given. My reading of Dewey is, therefore, a reading
that  amounts  to  claiming  that  the  default  setting  in  much contemporary  philosophy  re  the
foundational nature of the linguistic needs to be adjusted. There is much at stake here.
12. Cf. Shusterman (2010: 37) for this way of reading Dewey’s notion of our experience of art.
13. A good starting point for contemporary debate about nonconceptual content is Gunther 2003.
14. Cf. Fodor 1975, 2008, and many other places.
15. Ignoring the transition problem might seem an act of outrageous bravado, but the point is
simple. If there is an answer to the transition problem, it will arise in the detail of the account we
provide in pulling together a staged bootstrapping account of learning. It will not be settled in a
single sentence.
16. ‘Brought up,’ for these things are only properly understood in the context of their natural
history, something Wittgenstein (2009: § 25) emphasized too: “Giving orders, asking questions,
telling  stories,  having  a  chat,  are  as  much a  part  of  our  natural  history  as  walking,  eating,
drinking, playing.”
17. For the generality constraint, cf. Evans 1982.
18. Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of a path, indeed a garden path, for the idea of a rule: see
Wittgenstein (2005: § 90; and 1978: § 163).
19. See Cook 2000 for a good starting point on the literature on children’s language and play.
20. Having the aesthetic order restored is also, perhaps, part of what Wittgenstein meant by
bringing peace to philosophical perplexities. If so, his quietism is momentary, not enduring; it
applies  to  the  settlement  of  a  moment  in  a  Deweyan  dynamic,  rather  than  an  endpoint  to
philosophy.
21. “An adequate recognition of the play of imagination as the medium of realization of every
kind of thing which lies beyond the scope of direct physical response is the sole way of escape
from mechanical methods in teaching” (MW 9: 245).
22. The  big  questions  concern  how  much  native  ability  is  required  in  order  to  support
communication and the pursuit of inquiry. For an exploration of this in a manner that captures
something of Dewey’s insistence on avoiding too intellectualist a view of experience, see Malloch
& Trevarthen 2009.
23. For  an  implicit  grasp  of  the  elusiveness  and yet  centrality  of  things  that  fall  under  the
aesthetics of experience as I have been promoting it, see the detailed account of a year in the life
of a New York kindergarten class in Diamond 2008.
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ABSTRACTS
In Democracy and Education Dewey has a rich conception of educational flourishing that stands at
odds  with  the  instrumentalism  about  learning  endemic  to  much  contemporary  educational
policy.  And  his  vision  posits  deep  dependencies  between  the  different  domains  in  which
education  is  transformative:  the  transformation  of  the  individual  learner  into  an  inquirer
equipped  to  adapt  in  a  changing  environment  and  the  transformations  in  the  social  world
required for the provision of opportunities for such experiences to all. In this paper, I trace the
roots of Dewey’s conception in his account of inquiry. I focus on the key concept of a ‘problem.’
For Dewey, inquiry begins with a problem, but his concept of a problem is challenging and lacks
an  adequate  theoretical  rationale.  Problems  start  with  disruptions  in  our  environmental
engagement  that  figure  in  non-knowing  encounters.  Dewey  needs  an  account  of  these  pre-
cognitive disruptions and of what constitutes their resolution. I argue that the account can be
found in the aesthetics of experience. This draws upon some of Dewey’s insights regarding our
experience of art objects and it finds a central role for the aesthetics of experience as not only
the prompt for inquiry and the unification of experience that settles inquiry, but also in what I
call the ‘craft of inquiry’ – the very practice of inquiring. If this is right, any adequate account of
learning, let alone a pedagogy fit to encourage learning, must have a central role for aesthetics as
providing the conditions for the possibility of learning. A proper appreciation of Dewey signals
the  opportunity  for  a  radical  re-thinking  of  how  to  shape  a  pedagogy  fit  for  educational
flourishing – a  pedagogy designed for inquirers.  And it  helps us understand better the deep
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